Over the last half a century, China witnessed a profound demographic transition. Both mortality and fertility have declined, in a more rapid and dramatic way than in any other part of the world. Life expectancy in China rose from 43 to around 72 years during the 1950–2000 period, while fertility level dropped from more than six to less than two children per woman over the same
time period.
China experienced an impressive decline in death rates, particularly among infants, and a high, even rising birth rate in the 1950s due mainly to great improvement in people’s living conditions and social stability in those years after continuous wars during the 1930s and 1940s. As a result, population growth in China speeded up to an alarming level. This was followed by a demographic crisis, accompanied by massive excessive mortality and a sharp decline in the birth rate, occurring during 1959–1961, and caused mainly by the great famine. Even negative population growth was recorded in 1960. China recovered from this crisis in the next few years with a compensating birth peak in the middle 1960s. Overall, during the 15-year period of 1949–1964, China’s population increased from 500 million to 700 million, an average annual growth of 13 million.
Fertility decline began first in urban China in the 1960s, and this was followed by the nationwide fertility reduction in the 1970s. Total fertility rate dropped from 5.8 in 1970 to 2.8 in 1979 and decreased further to below replacement level in the 1990s. Over the same period, China’s mortality level continued its gradual decline. Consequently, the demographic pattern of China transformed from one characterized by high birth, high death and high growth to one characterized by low birth, low death and low growth.
The quality of Chinese population statistics is one of the most debated topics. This is a result partly of shortcomings of China’s statistics reporting and collection system, and partly of complexity of relevant issues. Although there are disagreements about the data accuracy, it is commonly accepted that China’s current total fertility rate stands at around 1.8. As a result of the fertility decline, it is estimated that in the last three decades, roughly 300 million births were
avoided.
Entering into the twenty first century, China’s population continued its growth, but the speed has slowed down further. The population natural growth rate declined from 10.55 per thousand in 1995 to 7.58 per thousand in 2000 and further down to 5.87 per thousand in 2004.
Nevertheless, due mainly to population momentum, the annual number of births in China remained as high as 16 million, and the annual net increment in population stood at 7.6 million
in 2005. There are marked regional and rural-urban variations in the path and timing of demographic transition. For instance, China’s urban fertility transition started as early as the mid-1960s, while similar fertility decline in rural China occurred in the early 1970s. By the late 1990s, the Total Fertility Rate (TFR) ranged from below one in big metropolitan cities like Shanghai and Beijing, to 3.11 in Tibet autonomous region. Such regional diversity can be observed with respect to many other aspects of China’s demographics. The serious imbalance in sex ratio at birth is another example.
The abnormal sex ratio at birth was first reported in the 1980s, and has got worse since then. It was reported that in 2005 for every 100 new-born girls, there were 124 boys, compared to 119.92 in 2000 and 111.42 in 1990. There are marked regional differences in this regard. In general, sex ratio at birth in western provinces and autonomous regions is more or less within the normal range, while serious abnormalities of this ratio are reported for the central and southern parts of China.
Variations in demographic transition, on the one hand, have been the consequence of regional variation in socio-economic and cultural conditions. On the other hand, they influenced local development. In particular, regional variation in economic development is one of the major causes of nationwide population migration.
It is certain that China’s population will continue to grow in the near future. The peak of the total population and the turning point of the population growth are important factors for future economic growth pattern in China.
Various population projections have been made based on different assumptions regarding future trends in fertility and mortality. China’s total population, even according to the lowest projection, will increase by at least 100 million to 1.4 billion before the growth finally stops around the middle of the twenty first century. The medium-growth scenario projected by the United Nations based on the assumption of continuation of current demographic patterns anticipates
that in the next half century the population of China will reach 1.5 billion, a net increase of 200 million from the present figure. About two thirds of the growth is anticipated to occur between 2000 and 2025, and China’s population will eventually stop growing before the middle of the twenty first century. India will finally overtake China as the country with the largest population in the world around 2030.
The future population growth will be largely determined by China’s government population policy and future socio-economic development. Although there have been continued debates on whether China should give up its “One Child policy (OCP)” that has been in effect over the last about 30 years, it seems most likely that Chinese government will stick to its current population policy, at least for the near future.
